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Abstract PHE – ONWJ platform personnel found 93 leaking tubes locations in the fin fan coolers/ gas-cooling heat 
exchanger. After analysis had been performed, the crack in the tube strongly indicate that stress corrosion cracking was 
occurred by chloride. Chloride stress corrosion cracking (CLSCC) is the cracking occurred by the combined influence of 
tensile stress and a corrosive environment. CLSCC is the one of the most common reasons why austenitic stainless steel 
pipework or tube and vessels deteriorate in the chemical processing, petrochemical and maritime industries. In this 
research purpose to determine the appropriate inspection planning for two main items (tubes and header box) in the gas-
cooling heat exchanger using risk based inspection (RBI) method. The result, inspection of the tubes must be performed 
on July 6, 2024 and for the header box inspection must be performed on July 6, 2025. In the end, RBI method can be 
applicated to gas-cooling heat exchanger. Because, risk on the tubes can be reduced from 4.537 m2/year to 0.453 m2/year. 
And inspection planning for header box can be reduced from 4.528 m2/year to 0.563 m2/year. 
 
Keywords chloride stress corrosion cracking, inspection plan, RBI. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION
1
 
On October, 2013, Pertamina Hulu Energi 
Offshore North West Java (PHE – ONWJ) platform 
personnel found 93 leaking tubes reported in gas 
cooling heat exchanger on the one of Pertamina 
platform (Figure 1). This situation made the gas 
cooling heat exchanger not in a good performance. 
Furthermore PHE-ONWJ need effective maintenance 
strategy for oil and gas platform equipment especially 
for gas cooling heat exchanger. 
According to the function of heat exchangers, there 
are view types of heat exchangers used in oil and gas 
facility, they are; shell and tube, double pipe, plate 
and frame, aerial cooler, bath type, forced air, and 
direct fired [1]. 
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Based on the explanation above, Pertamina PHE-
ONWJ gas cooling heat exchanger classified as areal 
cooler heat exchanger because its function is cooling 
the gas with a fan in to near ambient temperature. 
Heat exchanger is the one of crucial equipment  in 
the processing facility especially in the oil and gas 
industry sector. Heat exchanger is used to transfer 
heat between one and more fluids. Ones of heat 
exchanger application is for cooling the gas before 
injected to the oil reservoir. Gas injection is the 
method to increase oil production by boosting 
depleted pressure in the reservoir (figure 2). Another 
function of gas cooling heat exchanger is for cooling 
the gas before supply the gas turbine to generated 
electric power on the platform 
American Petroleum Institute (API) is the one of 
the most widely used standard guideline in oil and 
gas company around the world besides DNV-GL. 
 
 
PHE ONWJ platform adopt guidelines from API 
660 and API 661 for gas cooling heat exchanger 
fabrication and installation. One of maintenance 
strategies for gas cooling heat exchanger can be 
developed by using Risk Based Inspection (RBI). by 
using RBI company will get information using risk 
analysis to develop an effective inspection plan. 
 
 
Figure. 1. Gas-cooling heat exchanger leakage report (Company report, 2013) 
Source: Pertamina PHE-ONWJ inspection report, 2013 
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Identification of company equipment is the 
beginning of the systematic process in the inspection 
planning. Probability of failure and consequence of 
failure are the basic formula to calculate the RBI and 
must be evaluated by considering all damage 
mechanism directly effect to the equipment or the 
system. However, failure scenarios according to the 
actual damage mechanism should be develop and 
considered. 
RBI methodology produces optimal inspection 
planning for the asset and make the priority from the 
lower risk to the higher risk. In other word inspection 
planning in RBI focused to identification what to 
inspect, how to inspect, where to inspect and how 
often to inspect. Inspection planning used to control 
degradation of the asset and the company will get 
considerable impact in the system operation and the 
appropriate economic consequences [2-18]. 
 
Figure. 2. optimization oil production by gas injection method 
 
 
II. METHOD 
The information of inspection planning in risk 
based inspection based on the risk analysis of the 
equipment. The purpose of the risk analysis is to 
identify the potential degradation mechanisms and 
threats to the integrity of the equipment and to assess 
the consequences and risk of failure [3].  
 
A. Risk 
Risk is defined as the combination probability of 
asset failure and consequence if the failure happened. 
Risk can be expressed numerically with formula (1) 
as shown below. 
 
Risk = Probability x Consequence  (1) 
Probability of Failure  
The probability of failure may be determined based 
on one, or a combination of the following methods: 
 
- Structural reliability models  
In this method, a limit state is defined based on a 
structural model that includes all relevant damage 
mechanisms, and uncertainties in the independent 
variables of this models are defined in terms of 
statistical distributions. The resulting model is solved 
directly for the probability of failure. 
 
 
- Statistical models based on generic data  
In this method, generic data is obtained for the 
component and damage mechanism under evaluation 
and a statistical model is used to evaluate the 
probability of failure. 
 
-  Expert judgment  
In this method, expert solicitation is used to 
evaluate the component and damage mechanism, a 
probability of failure can typically only be assigned 
on a relative basis using this method. 
 
In API RBI, a combination of the above is used to 
evaluate the probability of failure in terms of a 
generic failure frequency and damage factor. The 
probability of failure calculation is obtained from the 
equation (2). 
 
Pof (t) = gff x Df (t) x FMS (2) 
Where: 
gff       = generic failure frequency 
Df (t)   = damage factor 
FMS    = management system factor 
 
B. Generic Failure Frequency (gff) 
The generic failure frequency can be determined by 
asset failure of common industries. The generic 
failure frequency is expected to the previous failure 
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frequency to any specific damage happening from 
exposure to the operating environment. There are 
four different damage hole sizes model the release 
scenarios covering a full range of events they are 
small, medium, large, and rupture. 
If the data of the asset is complete, actual 
probabilities of the failure could be calculated with 
actual observed failures. Even if a failure has not 
occurred in a component, the true probability of 
failure is likely to be greater than zero because the 
component may not have operated long enough to 
experience a failure. As a first step in estimating this 
non-zero probability, it is necessary to examine a 
larger set of data of similar components to find 
enough failures such that a reasonable estimate of a 
true probability of failure can be made. 
This generic component set of data is used to 
produce a generic failure frequency for the 
component. The generic failure frequency of a 
component type is estimated using records from all 
plants within a company or from various plants 
within an industry, from literature sources, and 
commercial reliability data bases. Therefore, these 
generic values typically represent an industry in 
general and do not reflect the true failure frequencies 
for a specific component subject to a specific damage 
mechanism. 
The generic failure frequency is intended to be the 
failure frequency representative of failures due to 
degradation from relatively benign service prior to 
accounting for any specific operating environment, 
and are provided for several discrete hole sizes for 
various types of processing equipment (i.e. process 
vessels, drums, towers, piping systems, tankage, etc.). 
A recommended list of generic failure frequencies 
is provided in Table 1. The generic failure 
frequencies are assumed to follow a log-normal 
distribution, with error rates ranging from 3% to 
10%. Median values are given in Table 1. The data 
presented in the Table 1 is based on the best available 
sources and the experience of the API RBI Sponsor 
Group. 
The overall generic failure frequency for each 
component type was divided across the relevant hole 
sizes, i.e. the sum of the generic failure frequency for 
each hole size is equal to the total generic failure 
frequency for the component. 
 
TABLE 1 
SUGGESTED COMPONENT GENERIC FAILURE FREQUENCIES (GFF) 
Equipment type Component type 
gff as a Function of Hole Size (failures/yr) gff(total) 
Small Medium Large Rupture (failures/yr) 
Pipe PIPE-1 2.80E-05 0 0 2.60E-06 3.06E-05 
Vessel/ FinFan FINFAN 8.00E-06 2.00E-05 2.00E-06 6.00E-07 3.06E-05 
 
 
C. Management System Factor 
Management system factor used to measure how 
good the facility management system that may arise 
due to an accident and labor force of the plant is 
trained to handle the asset. This evaluation consists of 
a series of interviews with plant management, 
operations, inspection, maintenance, engineering, 
training, and safety personnel. 
The management systems evaluation procedure 
developed for API RBI covers all areas of a plant’s 
PSM system that impact directly or indirectly on the 
mechanical integrity of process equipment. The 
management systems evaluation is based in large part 
on the requirements contained in API Recommended 
Practices and Inspection Codes. It also includes other 
proven techniques in effective safety management. A 
listing of the subjects covered in the management 
systems evaluation and the weight given to each 
subject is presented in Table 2. 
The management systems evaluation covers a wide 
range of topics and, as a result, requires input from 
several different disciplines within the facility to 
answer all questions. Ideally, representatives from the 
following plant functions should be interviewed: 
a) Plant Management 
b) Operations 
c) Maintenance 
d) Safety 
e) Inspection 
f) Training 
g) Engineering 
 
The scale recommended for converting a 
management systems evaluation score to a 
management systems factor is based on the 
assumption that the “average” plant would score 50% 
(500 out of a possible score of 1000) on the 
management systems evaluation, and that a 100% 
score would equate to a one order-of magnitude 
reduction in total unit risk. Based on this ranking, 
equation (3) and equation (4) may be used to 
compute a management systems factor, , for any 
management systems evaluation score. 
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TABLE 2 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EVALUATION 
Table Title Questions Points 
2.A.1 Leadership and Administration 6 70 
2.A.2 Process Safety Information 10 80 
2.A.3 Process Hazard Analysis 9 100 
2.A.4 Management of Change 6 80 
2.A.5 Operating Procedures 7 80 
2.A.6 Safe Work Practices 7 85 
2.A.7 Training 8 100 
2.A.8 Mechanical Integrity 20 120 
2.A.9 Pre-Startup Safety Review 5 60 
2.A.10 Emergency Response 6 65 
2.A.11 Incident Investigation 9 75 
2.A.12 Contractors 5 45 
2.A.13 Audits 4 40 
Total 102 1000 
 
*Note that the management score must first be 
converted to a percentage (between 0 and 100) as 
follows: 
  
    (3) 
 (4) 
 
D. Thinning Damage Factor 
The calculation procedures of thinning damage 
factor are: 
a) Determine the number of inspections, and the 
corresponding inspection effectiveness category 
for all past inspections. Combine the inspections 
to the highest effectiveness performed. 
b) Determine the time in-service (age) since the last 
inspection thickness reading (trd). 
c) Determine the corrosion rate for the base metal 
(Cr,bm) based on the material of construction and 
process environment, where the component has 
cladding, a corrosion rate (Cr,cm) must also be 
obtained for the cladding. 
d) Determine the minimum required wall thickness 
(  per the original construction code or using 
API 579. If the component is a tank bottom, then 
in accordance with API 653 (  = 0.1 in) if the 
tank does not have a release prevention barrier 
and (  = 0.05 in) if the tank has a release 
prevention barrier.  
e) For clad components, calculate the time or age 
from the last inspection required to corrode away 
the clad material,  , using equation (5).  
 
 = max [(  = N/A (5) 
  
f) Determine the  parameter using Equation 
below, based on the age and from step b, from 
step c, from step d and the age required to 
corrode away the cladding, , if applicable 
from step e. For components without cladding, 
and for components where the cladding is 
corroded away at the time of the last inspection 
(i.e.  = 0.0), use Equation (6). 
 
 (6) 
g) Determine the damage factor for thinning, , 
using Equation (2.13). 
 
 (7) 
 
E. Stress Corrosion Cracking Damage Factor 
The calculation procedures of chloride stress 
corrosion cracking (CL-SCC) damage factor are: 
a) Determine the number of inspections, and the 
corresponding inspection effectiveness category 
for all past inspections. Combine the inspections 
to the highest effectiveness performed. 
b) Determine the time in-service (age) since the last 
Level A, B, C or D inspection was performed. 
c) Determine the susceptibility for cracking using 
Table 3 based on the operating temperature and 
concentration of the chloride ions. Note that a 
HIGH susceptibility should be used if cracking is 
known to be present. 
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TABLE 3 
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CRACKING – CLSCC 
pH ≤ 10 
Temperature 
(°C) 
Susceptibility to Cracking as a Function of Chloride ion (ppm) 
1-10 11-100 101-1000 >1000 
38 – 66 Low Medium Medium High 
>66 – 93 Medium Medium High High 
>93 – 149 Medium High High High 
pH > 10 
Temperature 
(°C) 
Susceptibility to Cracking as a Function of Chloride ion (ppm) 
1-10 11-100 101-1000 >1000 
< 93 Low Low Low Low 
93 -149 Low Low Low Medium 
 
 
TABLE 4 
DETERMINATION OF SEVERITY INDEX – CLSCC 
Susceptibility Severity Index – SVI 
High 5000 
Medium 500 
Low 50 
None 1 
  
 
d) Based on the susceptibility in step c, and 
determine the severity index,  from table (4). 
e) Determine the base damage factor for CLSCC, 
 using table (5) based on the number of, 
and the highest inspection effectiveness 
determined in step a, and the severity index, , 
from step d. 
f) Calculate the escalation in the damage factor 
based on the time in-service since the last 
inspection using the age from step b and 
equation below. In this equation, it is 
assumed that the probability for cracking 
will increase with time since the last 
inspection as a result of increased exposure 
to upset conditions and other non-normal 
conditions. 
 
 =  (age)1.1 (8) 
 
 
 
F. Consequence Analysis 
The calculations of consequence procedures are: 
a) Select a representative fluid group from Table 6. 
TABLE 5 
 SCC DAMAGE FACTORS – ALL SCC MECHANISMS 
SVI 
Inspection Effectiveness 
E 
1 Inspection 2 Inspections 3 Inspections 
D C B A D C B A D C B A 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 10 8 3 1 1 6 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 
50 50 40 17 5 3 30 10 2 1 20 5 1 1 
100 100 80 33 10 5 60 20 4 1 40 10 2 1 
500 500 400 170 50 25 300 100 20 5 200 50 8 1 
1000 1000 800 330 100 50 600 200 40 10 400 100 16 2 
5000 5000 4000 1670 500 250 3000 1000 250 50 2000 500 80 10 
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b) Determine the stored fluid properties using 
equation (9) and Table 7 (MW: Molecular 
weight; k: ideal gas specific ratio, AIT: Auto 
Ignition Temperature). 
 
 (9) 
 
c) Determine the steady state phase of the fluid 
after release to the atmosphere, using Table 
8  and the phase of the fluid stored in the 
equipment as determined in step b. 
d) Based on the component type and Table 9, 
determine the release hole size diameters 
(dn). 
e) Determine the generic failure frequency (gffn), 
and the total generic failure frequency from this 
table or from equation (10). 
 
 (10) 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE FLUIDS AVAILABLE FOR LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS 
Representative Fluid Fluid TYPE Examples of Applicable Materials 
C₁ -C₂  TYPE 0 methane, ethane, ethylene, LNG, fuel gas 
C₃ -C₄  TYPE 0 propane, butane, isobutane, LPG 
C₅  TYPE 0 Pentane 
C₆ -C₈  TYPE 0 gasoline, naptha, light stright run, heptane 
C₉ -C₁ ₂  TYPE 0 diesel, kerosene 
C₁ ₃ -C₁ ₆  TYPE 0 jet fuel, kerosene, atmospheric gas oil 
C₁ ₇ -C₂ ₅  TYPE 0 gas oil, typical crude 
 
 
TABLE 7 
PROPERTIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE FLUIDS USED IN LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS 
F
lu
id
 
M
W
 
L
iq
u
id
 D
en
si
ty
 
(k
g
/m
³)
 
N
B
P
 (
°C
) 
A
m
b
ie
n
t 
S
ta
te
 
Id
ea
l 
G
a
s 
S
p
ec
if
ic
 
H
ea
t 
E
q
. 
Cp 
A
u
to
-I
g
n
it
io
n
 
T
em
p
. 
(°
C
) 
Id
ea
l 
G
a
s 
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
A
 
Id
ea
l 
G
a
s 
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
B
 
Id
ea
l 
G
a
s 
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
C
 
Id
ea
l 
G
a
s 
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
D
 
Id
ea
l 
G
a
s 
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
E
 
C₁ -C₂  23 250.512 -125 Gas Note 1 12.3 1.15E-01 -2.87E-05 -1.30E-09 N/A 558 
C₃ -C₄  51 538.379 -21 Gas Note 1 2.632 0.3188 -1.35E+04 1.47E-08 N/A 369 
C₅  72 625.199 36 Liquid Note 1 -3.626 0.4873 -2.60E-04 5.30E-08 N/A 284 
C₆ -C₈  100 684.018 99 Liquid Note 1 -5.146 6.76E-01 -3.65E-04 7.66E-08 N/A 223 
C₉ -
C₁ ₂  
149 734.012 184 Liquid Note 1 -8.5 1.01E+00 -5.56E-04 1.18E-07 N/A 208 
C₁ ₃ -
C₁ ₆  
205 764.527 261 Liquid Note 1 -11.7 1.39E+00 -7.72E-04 1.67E-07 N/A 202 
C₁ ₇ -
C₂ ₅  
280 775.019 344 Liquid Note 1 -22.4 1.94E+00 -1.12E-03 -2.53E-07 N/A 202 
C₂ ₅ ₊  422 900.026 527 Liquid Note 1 -22.4 1.94E+00 -1.12E-03 -2.53E-07 N/A 202 
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TABLE 8 
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING THE PHASE OF A FLUID 
Phase of Fluid at Normal 
Operating (Storage) 
Conditions 
Phase of Fluid at 
Ambient (after release) 
Conditions 
API RBI Determination of Final Phase for 
Consequence Calculation 
Gas Gas model as gas 
Gas Liquid model as gas 
Liquid Gas 
model as gas unless the fluid boiling point at ambient 
conditions is greater than 80°F, then model as a 
liquid 
Liquid Liquid model as liquid 
 
 
TABLE 9 
RELEASE HOLE SIZES AND AREA USED 
Release Hole Number Release Hole Size 
Range of Hole Diameters 
(mm) 
Release Hole Diameter, dn 
(mm) 
1 Small 0 – 6.4 D1 = 6.4 
2 Medium >6.4 – 51 D2 = 25 
3 Large >51 – 152 D3 = 102 
4 Rupture >152 D4 = min[D, 406] 
    
f) Select the appropriate release rate equation as 
described above using the stored fluid phase 
g) For each release hole size, compute the release 
hole size area (An) using equation (11). 
 
=  (11) 
h) For each release hole size, calculate the release 
rate (Wn) with equation (12) for each release area 
(An) 
 
 =  x  x  x  
 (12) 
i) Group components and equipment items into 
inventory groups using Table 10. 
j) Calculate the fluid mass (masscomp) in the 
component being evaluated. 
k) Calculate the fluid mass in each of the other 
components that are included in the inventory 
group (masscomp,i). 
l) Calculate the fluid mass in the inventory group 
(massinv) using Equation (13). 
 
   (13)
 
TABLE 10  
ASSUMPTION WHEN CALCULATING LIQUID INVENTORIES WITHIN EQUIPMENT 
Equipment Description Component Type Examples Default Liquid Volume Percent 
Knock-out Pots and Dryers 
KODRUM 
 
Compressor Knock-outs, Fuel Gas 
KO Drums, Flare Drums, Air 
Dryers. 
10% liquid 
Much less liquid inventory 
expected in knock-out drums 
Compressors 
COMPC 
COMPR 
COMPR 
Centrifugal and Reciprocating 
Compressors 
Negligible, 0% 
Heat Exchangers 
HEXSS 
HEXTS 
Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers 
50% shell-side, 25% tube-side 
 
Fin Fan Air Coolers 
FINFAN 
 
Total Condensers, Partial 
Condensers, Vapor Coolers and 
Liquid Coolers 
25% liquid 
Filters FILTER 
 
100% full 
Piping PIPE-xx  
100% full, calculated for Level 2 
Analysis 
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m) Calculate the flow rate from a 203 mm [8 in] 
diameter hole (Wmax8) using equations above, as 
applicable, with An = A8 = 32,450 mm
2
 [50.3 
in
2
]. This is the maximum flow rate that can be 
added to the equipment fluid mass from the 
surrounding equipment in the inventory group. 
n) For each release hole size, calculate the added 
fluid mass (massadd,n) with equation (14) 
resulting from three minutes of flow from the 
inventory group using equation below where Wn 
is the leakage rate for the release hole size being 
evaluated and Wmax8 is from last step. 
 
massadd,n = 180 . min [Wn , Wmax8] (14) 
o) For each release hole size, calculate the available 
mass for release using equation (15). 
 
Massavail,n = min[{masscomp + massadd,n}, massinv] (15) 
p) For each release hole size, calculate the time 
required to release 4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs] of 
fluid. 
 
 (16) 
q) For each release hole size, determine if the 
release type is instantaneous or continuous using 
the following criteria. 
- If the release hole size is 6.35 mm [0.25 
inches] or less, then the release type is 
continuous. 
- If 180 tn ≤ sec or the release mass is greater 
than 4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs], then the release 
is instantaneous; otherwise, the release is 
continuous 
r) Determine the detection and isolation systems 
present in the unit. 
s) Using Table 11 select the appropriate 
classification (A, B, C) for the detection system.
  
 
 
TABLE 11  
DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEM RATING GUIDE 
Type of Detection System 
Detection 
Classification 
Instrumentation designed specifically to detect material losses by changes in 
operating conditions (i.e., loss of pressure or flow) in the system 
A 
Suitably located detectors to determine when the material is present outside the 
pressure-containing envelope 
B 
Visual detection, cameras, or detectors with marginal coverage C 
Type of Isolation System 
Isolation 
Classification 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated directly from process instrumentation 
or detectors, with no operator intervention 
A 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated by operators in the control room or 
other suitable locations remote from the leak 
B 
Isolation dependent on manually-operated valves C 
 
 
TABLE 12  
ADJUSTMENTS TO RELEASE BASED ON DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEMS 
System Classifications 
Release Magnitude Adjustment 
Reduction 
Factor, factdi Detection Isolation 
A A Reduce release rate or mass by 25% 0.25 
A B Reduce release rate or mass by 20% 0.20 
A or B C Reduce release rate or mass by 10% 0.10 
B B Reduce release rate or mass by 15% 0.15 
C C No adjustment to release rate to mass 0.00 
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TABLE 13  
LEAK DURATIONS BASED ON DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEMS 
Detecting System 
Rating 
Isolation System 
Rating 
Maximum Leak Duration, ldmax 
A A 
20 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
10 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
5 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
A B 
30 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
10 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
A C 
40 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
30 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
B A or B 
40 minutes for 6.4 mm leaks 
30 minutes for 25 mm leaks 
20 minutes for 102 mm leaks 
 
 
t) Using Table 11 select the appropriate 
classification (A, B, C) for the isolation system. 
u) Using Table 12 and the classifications 
determined in step s & t, determine the release 
reduction factor, factdi. 
v) Using Table 13 and the classifications 
determined in step s & t, determine the total leak 
durations for each of the selected release hole 
sizes, ldmax,n. 
w) For each release hole size, calculate the adjusted 
release rate (raten) using equation (17) where the 
theoretical release rate (Wn). 
 
raten = Wn(1-factdi) (17) 
x) For each release hole size, calculate the leak 
duration (ldn) of the release using Equation 
4.13, based on the available mass 
(massavail,n), and the adjusted release rate 
(raten) from step. Note that the leak duration 
cannot exceed the maximum duration 
(Idmax,n) determined in step w. 
 
  (18) 
y) For each release hole size, calculate the 
release mass (massn), using equation (19) 
based on the release rate (raten), the leak 
duration (ldn), and the available mass 
(massavail,n). 
 
massn = min [{raten . ldn} , massavail,n] (19) 
z) Select the consequence area mitigation reduction 
factor (factmit) from Table 14. 
aa) b For each release hole size, calculate the energy 
efficiency correction factor, (eneffn) using 
equation below. 
 
 – 15 (20) 
bb) Determine the fluid type, either TYPE 0 or 
TYPE 1 from Table 6. 
cc) For each release hole size, compute the 
component damage consequence areas for 
Autoignition Not Likely, Continuous Release 
(AINL-CONT)  
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
(  and b (  from the 
Table 15 will be needed to assure selection 
of the correct constants. 
- If the release is a gas or vapor and the fluid 
type is TYPE 0, then use equation (21) for 
the consequence area and for the release 
rate. 
 
=  x 
 (21)
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TABLE 14  
ADJUSTMENTS TO FLAMMABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR MITIGATION SYSTEMS 
Mitigation System 
Consequence Area 
Adjustment 
Consequence Area 
Reduction Factor 
(factmit) 
Inventory blowdown, coupled with 
isolation system classification B or 
higher 
Reduce consequence area by 
25% 
0.25 
Fire water deluge system and monitors 
Reduce consequence area by 
20% 
0.20 
Fire water monitors only 
Reduce consequence area by 
5% 
0.05 
Foam spray system 
Reduce consequence area by  
15% 
0.15 
 
 
 
TABLE 15  
COMPONENT DAMAGE FLAMMABLE CONSEQUENCE EQUATION CONSTANTS 
Fluid 
Continuous Releases Constants 
Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely 
(CAINL) (CAIL) 
Gas Liquid Gas Liquid 
a b a B A b a B 
C₁ -C₂  8.669 0.98     55.13 0.95     
C₃ -C₄  10.13 1.00     64.23 1.00     
C₅  5.115 0.99 100.6 0.89 62.41 1.00     
C₆ -C₈  5.846 0.98 34.17 0.89 63.98 1.00 103.4 0.95 
C₉ -C₁ ₂  2.419 0.98 24.6 0.90 76.98 0.95 110.3 0.95 
C₁ ₃ -C₁ ₆      12.11 0.90     196.7 0.92 
C₁ ₇ -C₂ ₅      3.785 0.90     165.5 0.92 
C₂ ₅ ₊      2.098 0.91     103.0 0.90 
Fluid 
Instantaneous Releases Constants 
Auto-Ignition Not Likely Auto-Ignition Likely 
(IAINL) (IAIL) 
Gas Liquid Gas Liquid 
a b a B A b a B 
C₁ -C₂  6.469 0.67     163.7 0.62     
C₃ -C₄  4.590 0.72     79.94 0.63     
C₅  2.214 0.72 0.271 0.85 41.38 0.61     
C₆ -C₈  2.188 0.66 0.749 0.78 41.49 0.61 8.180 0.55 
C₉ -C₁ ₂  1.111 0.66 0.559 0.76 42.28 0.61 0.848 0.53 
C₁ ₃ -C₁ ₆      0.086 0.88     1.714 0.88 
C₁ ₇ -C₂ ₅      0.021 0.91     1.068 0.91 
C₂ ₅ ₊      0.006 0.99     0.284 0.99 
 
 
dd) For each release hole size, compute the 
component damage consequence areas for 
Autoignition Likely, Continuous Release (AIL-
CONT), (  
- Determine the appropriate constants, a 
(  and b (  The release 
phase will be needed to assure selection of 
the correct constants. 
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- If the release type is gas or vapor, Type 0 or 
Type 1, then use equation (21) to compute the 
consequence area and compute the effective 
release rate. 
 
=  x 
 (22) 
ee) For each release hole size, compute the 
component damage consequence areas for 
Autoignition Not Likely, Instantaneous Release 
(AINL-INST) 
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
(  and b ( . The release 
phase will be needed to assure selection of 
the correct constants. 
- If the release is a gas or vapor and the fluid 
type is TYPE 0, or the fluid type is TYPE 1, 
then use equation (23) for the consequence 
area and the effective release rate. 
 
=  x  (23) 
ff) For each release hole size, compute the 
component damage consequence areas for 
Autoignition Likely, Instantaneous Release 
(AIL-INST) (  
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
(  and b ( . The release 
phase will be needed to assure selection of 
the correct constants. 
- If the release type is gas or vapor, Type 0 or 
Type 1, then use equation (24) to compute the 
consequence area and to compute the 
effective release rate. 
 
=  x  (24) 
gg) For each release hole size, compute the 
personnel injury consequence areas for Auto-
ignition Not Likely, Continuous Release (AINL-
CONT) (  
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
(  and b . The 
release phase will be needed to assure 
selection of the correct constants. 
- Compute the consequence area using 
Equation (25) where  is 
from step cc. 
 
=  x 
 (25) 
hh) For each release hole size, compute the 
personnel injury consequence areas for Auto-
ignition Likely, Continuous Release (AIL-
CONT) (  
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
( ) and b . The release 
phase will be needed to assure selection of 
the correct constants. 
- Compute the consequence area using 
equation (26) where   
 
=   x 
 (26) 
For each release hole size, compute the 
personnel injury consequence areas for Auto-
ignition Not Likely, Instantaneous Release 
(AINL-INST) (  
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
) and b ( . The 
release phase will be needed to assure 
selection of the correct constants. 
- Compute the consequence area using 
equation (27) where  
 
=  x 
 (27) 
ii) For each release hole size, compute the 
personnel injury consequence areas for Auto-
ignition Likely, Instantaneous Release (AIL-
INST) (  
- Determine the appropriate constants a 
( ) and b ( . The release 
phase will be needed to assure selection of 
the correct constants. 
- Compute the consequence area using 
equation (28) where . 
 
=  x 
 (28) 
 
jj) For each release hole size, calculate the 
instantaneous/continuous blending factor 
( . 
- For Continuous Releases – To smooth out the 
results for releases that are near the 
continuous to instantaneous transition point 
(4,536 kgs [10,000 lbs] in 3 minutes, or a 
release rate of 25.2 kg/s [55.6 lb/s]), then the 
blending factor use equation (29). 
 
= min  (29) 
- For Instantaneous Releases – Blending is not 
required. Since the definition of an 
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instantaneous release is one with a adjusted 
release rate (raten) greater than 25.2 kg/s 
[55.6 lb/s] (4536 kg [10,000 lbs] in 3 
minutes), then the blending factor use 
equation (30). 
 
= 1.0 (30) 
kk) Calculate the AIT blending factor , 
using some equations, as applicable. Since Ts 
(450.15 kelvin) + C₆  (56) < AIT (831.150) then 
the equation (313) 
 
 (31) 
ll) Compute the continuous/instantaneous blended 
consequence areas for the component using 
equations (32) – (35). 
 
 
 (32)
  
 
 (33) 
 
 
 (34)
 
 
 (35) 
 
  
mm) Compute the AIT blended consequence areas 
for the component using equations (36) and 
(37). The resulting consequence areas are the 
component damage and personnel injury 
flammable consequence areas. 
 
 
 (36)
  
 (37)
  
nn) Determine the final consequence areas 
(probability weighted on release hole size) for 
component damage and personnel injury using 
equations below. 
 
 =  (38) 
  
 =  (39)
  
III. RESULT 
The result of calculation shown in the Table 16 and 
17. 
 
 
TABLE 16 
CALCULATION RESULTS SUMMARIES FOR TUBE 
Damage factor at RBI date 3790.5977 
Damage factor at plan date 8716.0138 
Total generic failure frequency 0.0000306 
Total factor management system 50% 
Probability of failure (RBI date) 0.083562 
Probability of failure (Plan date) 0.197204 
Total consequence area for equipment damage 14.07017389 m2 
Total consequence area for personnel injury 34.02010644 m2 
Risk at RBI date 1.973035017 m2/year 
Risk at Plan Date 4.536751674 m2/year 
Risk target 3.71612 m2/year 
Next inspection date 12/20/2019 
Risk Area with Inspection 0.29248 m2/year 
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TABLE 17 
CALCULATION RESULTS SUMMARIES FOR HEADER BOX 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
According to the analysis of the research study, 
then some conclusion could be taken as explain 
below: 
1. There are two damage factors obtained for the 
tube and header box. They are; thinning damage 
factor and CL-SCC damage factor and the result 
of the damage factor for the header box is 
7154.95 at RBI date and 30448.4 at plan date. 
For the tube, the damage factor is 2720.62 at 
RBI date and 4158.99 at the plan date. 
2. The risk area value for the tubes in the new 
inspection plan is 0.29248 m
2
/year and for the 
header box the new inspection plan is 0.56251 
m
2
/year. 
3. The inspection planning for the tubes could be 
generated on July 6, 2024 and inspection 
planning for the header box could be generated 
on July 6, 2025. 
4. Remaining life for the asset is 8.696 years. 
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Damage factor at RBI date 7154.9457 
Damage factor at plan date 30448.3875 
Total generic failure frequency 0.0000306 
Total factor management system 50% 
Probability of failure (RBI date) 0.109471 
Probability of failure (Plan date) 0.111739 
Total consequence area for equipment damage 4.020049682 m2 
Total consequence area for personnel injury 9.720030412 m2 
Risk at RBI date 1.064058236 m2/year 
Risk at Plan Date 4.528176567 m2/year 
Risk target 3.71612 m2/year 
Next inspection date 07/06/2025 
Risk Area with Inspection 0.56251 m2/year 
